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means of forward integration."1 ' Relatively weak suppliers might not
be able to adopt these alternative arrangements, and they would be left
with the alternatives of exclusive franchises and areas of primary re-
sponsibility, which probably would not be satisfactory substitutes for
territorial security."'
IV. CONCLUSION
The Government's policy toward territorial security seems to be part
of a broader policy of insistence upon unfettered competition at each
level in the distribution of goods.' 2 ' Such a policy, if successful, coupled
with the Government's apparent inability to effectively check the growth
of large-scale enterprise, can only serve to accentuate the trend toward
bigness in the American economy. It seems likely that the courts will
realize that the application of a rule of per se illegality to territorial
security would be economically unwise, and that they will evaluate the
legality of all exclusive territorial arrangements under the rule of reason.
QUIET TITLE ACTIONS IN INDIANA: SUGGESTED REFORM
A modern quiet title action is a statutorily authorized proceeding to
establish the status of title to real property by an adjudication of the
119. A manufacturer which performs all of the functions of distribution must
assume all of the risks and costs of distribution. It must establish the necessary sales
outlets and furnish them with adequate facilities and personnel for promotion, display
and, perhaps, servicing and repairing. Day, supra note 98, at 225. Relatively few firms
are able to make the investment required to take over all of the functions of distribution.
By putting distribution in the hands of independent businessmen, the supplier may relieve
itself of substantial social security taxes, unemployment taxes, business fees, occupational
taxes and the like, as well as burdens imposed by legislation such as labor laws. Then,
too, it is generally believed that independent distributors, with a personal stake in the
business, generally do a better job than persons with no direct pecuniary interest in the
business.
Forward integration may also present antitrust problems under section 2 of the
Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1958) or section 7 of the
Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958).
120. Exclusive franchises are relatively easy to establish, require almost no policing
and create comparatively few antitrust problems, but will have substantially the same
effects as territorial security only if dealers and consumers lack mobility. Stewart,
Exclusive Franwhises and Territorial Confinement of Distributors, 22 A.B.A. ANTITRUST
SEcTION 33, 47 (1963) ; Note, Restricted Channels of Distribution Under the Sherman
Act, supra note 112, at 809-11. Areas of primary responsibility may serve substantially
the same purposes as territorial security, but attempts to enforce primary responsibility
provisions may lead to serious practical and legal problems. See note 69 and text ac-
companying note 94 supra.
121. Robinson, supra note 97, at 286.
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validity of adverse claims in such property.' It is brought upon the theory
that the defendant asserts some interest in the property which is adverse
to that of the plaintiff. The object of the action is to forever settle the
title question; a judgment for plaintiff will conclusively adjudicate his
interest against the defendant and will bar the latter from asserting any
interest which he did present, or might have presented, at the time judg-
ment was rendered.2
I. AN IDEAL QUIET TITLE STATUTE
Because a quiet title statute is entirely a creature of the legislature,
it must be comprehensive. The statute must authorize given courts to
take jurisdiction and render judgment in quiet title actions, and it must
provide measures designed to protect a judgment, once rendered, from
the constant danger of attack. At the same time provision should be
made for safeguarding interests of claimants who are not given actual
notice, or who are under legal disability. Thus, in drafting quiet title
legislation, a delicate balance must be maintained between the opposing
interests of the need for security of property transactions and the sanctity
of individual interests in property. And, the drafters of such a statute
must never lose sight of the demands of procedural due process.
It would appear that the above objectives can best be accomplished
by a statute that integrates all aspects of a quiet title action. The de-
mands of convenience and the many special problems involved in statu-
torily effectuating various practical, policy and constitutional considera-
tions indicate that quiet title actions can most effectively be handled by
a body of interrelated special sections. As a matter of convenience, an
attorney or a court involved in a quiet title action should be able to find
the relevant sections easily, with no risk of overlooking any provision of
significance. To provide a standard against which the adequacy of Indi-
ana's present statutory scheme for quiet title actions may be judged, it is
necessary to discuss in some detail the provisions an ideal quiet title
statute would contain.
The authorization section is the cornerstone of a quiet title statute,
and it should make the action available to the claimants of all recognized
interests in real property. The statutes of many jurisdictions restrict the
availability of the action to persons with a fee ownership,' but it would
1. Note, Enhancing the Marketability of Land: The Suit to Quiet Title, 6S YALE
L.J. 1245, 1265 (1959).
2. Watson v. Lecklider, 147 Ind. 395, 45 N.E. 72 (1897) ; Hegarty v. Curtis, 121
Ind. App. 74, 95 N.E.2d 706 (1950).
3. See Note, supra note 1, at n.159. Cf. The Minnesota Marketable Title Act, Min .
STAT. § 541.023 (Supp. 1963), which was limited by Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Minn.
appear that there is no cogent reason for such a restriction. The holders
of lesser realty interests, which sometimes have greater present value
than a fee,4 should also be able to adjudicate the status of their interests.5
It is equally important that all adverse interests be subject to adjudication
in the action so that, as a result of the proceeding, the plaintiff can be
assured that no interests or possible interests are outstanding.
There must be a notice section to implement the authorization pro-
vision which provides plaintiffs with a legally sufficient means of giving
either actual or constructive notice of the proceeding to the holders of all
possible adverse interests. Selecting the proper mode of notification
presents serious practical, policy and constitutional problems.6 While the
interests of an adverse claimant may not constitutionally be cut off with-
out every reasonable opportunity for him to defend his claim, there are
many cases where the adverse claimant is unknown or cannot be located,
so that the plaintiff cannot give actual notice of the action. Therefore,
to provide optimum protection for the interests of both the plaintiff and
the adverse claimant within constitutional standards, there must be actual
notice where reasonable, but constructive notice must suffice where actual
notice would not be reasonable.
The minimum constitutional standards of procedural due process
which presumably apply to quiet title actions were set forth by the Su-
preme Court of the United States in imL ullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co.' The Court in Mullane refused to base its determination as to
88, 83 N.W.2d 800 (1957) to favor only fee simple owners. The limitation has been
criticized as unnecessarily restricting such legislation. BAYSE, CLEARING LAND TITLES
§ 176 (1958 Supp.). For an incorporation of the view that marketable title legislation
should affect nearly all interests in land, see The Indiana Marketable Title Act, IND.
ANN. STAT. § 56-1101 (Burns 1963 Supp.).
4. E.g., a long term lease.
5. It has been suggested that a plaintiff be permitted to bring a quiet title action
even though he has no property interest in the land involved, as when a grantor has
conveyed land with a defective title under a warranty deed and subsequently seeks to
cure the title. Covington, Bills To Remove Cloud on Title and Quieting Title in
Arkansas, 6 ARK. L.R. 83, 92 (1952). This has been allowed by some courts. Annot., 97
A.L.R. 711 (1935). However, it would not appear to be a desirable policy, for it involves
the determination of the rights of one not a party to the litigation, namely, the present
owner. See note 26 infra.
6. See Fraser, Jurisdiction by Necessity-An Analysis of the Mullane Case, 100
U. PA. L. REV. 305 (1951) ; Hayward, The Effect of Mudlane v. Central Hanover Bank
and Trust Company Upon Publication of Notice in Iowa, 36 IowA L. REv. 47 (1950);
Note, Due Process of Law and Notice by Publication, 32 IND. L.J. 469 (1957).
7. 339 U.S. 306 (1950). The Central Hanover Bank and Trust Company established
a common trust fund with one hundred thirteen participating trusts. In the proceeding
settling the trustee's account, the only notice given resident and nonresident beneficiaries,
some of whose addresses were known, was by publication in a local newspaper. Mullane
was appointed guardian and attorney for all beneficiaries not appearing. He objected
that the notice was inadequate to afford due process under the fourteenth amendment,
NOTES 809
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the sufficiency of the notice at issue upon the traditional jurisdictional
bases,' and held that personal service of written notice within the forum
state is always adequate, regardless of the nature of the proceeding. No-
tice by other means must be "reasonably calculated, under all the circum-
stances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and
afford them an opportunity to present their objections,"' and the means
by which the notice is given "must be such as one desirous of actually
informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it."'01 It
would therefore seem that if a nonresident defendant's name and resi-
dence is known, or can be ascertained with reasonable diligence, the
plaintiff must serve him with personal written notice." In Mullane, the
Court also discussed standards of notice in regard to persons who with
"due diligence" could not be identified or located, or whose interests were
either "conjectural or future."' 2 Recognizing the practical considerations
and argued that the New York Court was without jurisdiction to render a final and
binding decree.
Since the Court in Mullane interpreted the due process clause, it seems safe to
assume that the holding applies to all types of proceedings where notice must be given to
persons whose interests are affected-including quiet title actions. Fraser, supra note 6,
at 316, 319. Several cases subsequent to Midlane manifest the Court's intention that
Mullane is to have general application. E.g., Schroder v. New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962)
(condemnation) ; Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956) (eminent domain) ;
Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141 (1956) (tax foreclosure) ; City of New York
v. N.Y., N.H. & H.R.R. Co., 344 U.S. 293 (1953) (reorganization in bankruptcy);
Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428 (1951) (escheat).
8. There have traditionally been two jurisdictional bases under which a quiet title
action could be authorized. Actions that affected the interests in designated property of
all persons, whether known or unknown, were considered actions in rem, and actions
that affected only the interests in designated property of designated persons were con-
sidered actions quasi-in-rem. See Fraser, Actions it; Rem, 34 CORNELL L.Q. 29 (1948).
In discussing this distinction the Court in Mullane said:
American courts have sometimes classed certain actions as in ren because
personal service of process was not required, and at other times have held per-
sonal service of process not required because the action was in rein ...
Without disparaging the usefulness of distinctions between actions in rem and
those in personam in many branches of the law, or on other issues, or the
reasoning which underlies them, we do not rest the power of the State to resort
to constructive service in this proceeding upon how its courts or this Court may
regard this historic antithesis.
Id. at 312, 313.
9. Id. at 314.
10. Id. at 315.
11. See Fraser, supra note 6, at 313, 319; Note, supra note 6, at 489.
Some of the Court's language in Mullane suggests that in actions where there
is a res within the forum state, as would be the case in quiet title actions, publication
in addition to posting notice on the land would be sufficient. It appears, however, that
this would only be an additional measure of notification and would not suffice as the
exclusive means as to persons whose names and residence is known. The requirement
that the best notice reasonably possible must be given seems to override any other
consideration. See, e.g., Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962); Walker
v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956) ; Hayward, supra note 6, at 49.
12. 339 U.S. at 317. The phrases "due diligence" and "conjectural or future" are
difficult to define. In an eminent domain case applying the Mullane rule, the Court
NOTES
involved, it held that in such situations "employment of an indirect and
even a probably futile means of notification,""8 such as publication, is all
that could be expected. Thus, as enunciated in Mullane, procedural due
process demands that interested parties be given the best notice possible
under the circumstances, notwithstanding the nature of the proceeding or
the residence of the parties. It is imperative that an ideal quiet title
statute satisfy this requirement.
A quiet title statute should make available the ordinary legal and
equitable defenses to a civil action. To protect the interests of adverse
claimants not personally served with process from a plaintiff's unfounded
claim, a quiet title statute should require the plaintiff to prove to the
court the allegations of his complaint in regard to the rightfulness of his
title as a prerequisite to entering a "default" judgment. The court should
also be allowed to question the plaintiff concerning the rightfulness of
his title, and it should be given the right to consider possible defenses to
the action.'4 Such requirements would furnish a certain amount of pro-
tection to the interests of persons who cannot be located and are especially
desirable if the statute curtails the direct attack period.1"
Because of their inability to adequately defend an action, persons
tinder legal disability should receive special consideration in a quiet title
statute. Until recently there was considered to be no constitutional neces-
sity to specially treat this class of claimant." But, when this problem was
reconsidered by the Supreme Court of the United States in Covey v.
Town of Somers," it was held that notice to a person known to be an in-
competent, who is without the protection of a guardian, does not satisfy
the standard set forth in Mdulane." Although only constructive notice
indicated that in actions involving real property, the plaintiff is held to know the names
and addresses of interested parties that could be found in official records. Walker v.
City of Hutchinson, supra note 11.
13. 339 U.S. at 317.
14. This could be done by the court, or by a commissioner appointed by the court
for such purpose. See notes 56-57 and accompanying text infra.
15. See note 23 and accompanying text infra.
16. See, e.g., Vance v. Vance, 108 U.S. 514, 522 (1883) where the Supreme Court
of the United States said, "[T]he Constitution of the United States . . . gives to minors
no special rights beyond others. . . ." Thus it has been a matter of legislative discretion
as to whether such persons are given special consideration.
17. 351 U.S. 143 (1956).
18. In Covey the appellant, a resident of the Town of Somers, had been known to
be a mental incompetent without a guardian by the town officials, who instituted pro-
ceedings to foreclose a tax lien on her property. The appellant was given notice of the
proceedings by mail, by a notice posted at the local post office, and by publication
in two local newspapers as required by a New York statute, but she did not appear at the
proceedings. A judgment of foreclosure was entered against her by default. A guardian
was thereafter appointed, and he filed a motion to have the default judgment opened on
the grounds that the notice prescribed by the statute was inadequate in the case of a
known incompetent and, therefore, that the statute as applied was repugnant to the due
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was given in Covey, it would appear that the decision is broad enough to
allow the conclusion that even personal service of summons to a person
under legal disability 9 would not have been sufficient to satisfy the due
process clause.2" In such cases adequate notice can be given these persons
only if they are represented by a guardian. Since the Covey standard ap-
plies only to defendants who with due diligence could be known to be
under legal disability, it is logical that known defendants who are not
known to be under legal disability, and unknown defendants, can be given
notice in the same manner as any other defendant. Application of a con-
trary rule would undermine the effectiveness of a quiet title action, and
would not be constitutionally required.
From a policy standpoint, the incapacity of persons under legal dis-
ability to protect their own interests once notified of adverse claims must
be recognized by a quiet title statute as far as reasonably practical. Al-
though Covey involved only notice to a person under legal disability, the
standard would logically extend to representation by a guardian ad litem
at the hearing adjudicating the status of the respective interests of the
plaintiff and the legally disabled defendant. In fact, a statutory provi-
sion to this effect would appear a necessary requisite of due process.2
Moreover, when a defendant under legal disability is protected by a
guardian ad litem, the judgment rendered as a result of the action should
bind him in the same manner as it would bind a defendant not under legal
disability. Only in this way could the statute's primary objective of
settling all disputes over interests in the land involved be effectuated.
It is imperative that a quiet title judgment become conclusive within
a reasonable time after it is rendered so that a successful litigant can
process clause. The motion was denied by the trial court, and this was affirmed by the
New York Supreme Court and Court of Appeals. 283 App. Div. 883, 129 N.Y.S.2d 537
(1954), aff'd., 308 N.Y. 798, 125 N.E.2d 862 (1955). On appeal to the Supreme Court
of the United States, the case was reversed and the appellant's contention sustained.
19. In Covey the court was referring to a mental "incompetent." This term is not
as broad as the term "person under legal disability." However, the persons included
in the class of persons under "legal disability" (see note 62 ifra) are generally as
unable to protect their interests as a mental "incompetent."
20. At one point the Court stated that the appellant was "a person without mental
capacity to handle her affairs or to understand the meaning of any notice served upon
her. . . . " 351 U.S. at 146 (Emphasis added.) This language would seem to indicate
that even personal service of summons to the incompetent would not satisfy due process
standards. See, 55 MicH. L. REV. 287 (1956).
21. Although it has been required, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 17, § 1117(1) (1960), the
Covey standard does not require, nor would it be possible to require, the appointment
of a guardian ad litem to represent the interests of unknown defendants who are in fact
under legal disability. Since such a guardian could not know whom he was representing
or what interests the unknown persons had, he could defend the action only by saving the
unknown persons' interests, whatever they might be, from the effect of the judgment.
This would be inconsistent with the objective of a quiet title action which is to con-
clusively adjudicate the status of all adverse interests.
NOTES
realize its optimum value and effectiveness by being able to assure pro-
tection for subsequent good faith purchasers. Therefore, the statute
must yield a determination which is immune from direct attack for any
purpose, except for a relatively short time after judgment is rendered. A
lengthy period for direct attack admittedly helps to protect the interests of
those who are not notified of the proceedings or are incapable of defend-
ing their interests. However, if the initial requirements for the notifica-
tion of adverse claimants and for the protection of incompetent adverse
claimants are adequate, there should be no necessity for a lengthy direct
attack period. A shortened period would transgress no constitutional
guarantees as long as it was not so brief as to be an idle gesture;22 the
privilege of direct attack and limiting the period during which it may be
made are matters of legislative discretion.2" Legally sufficient methods
of notice and protection would also lessen the possibility of collateral
attack by persons against whom the judgment is void because of inade-
quate requirements.
II. THE INDIANA LAW AFFECTING QUIET TITLE ACTIONS
Indiana has no integrated quiet title statute and, with the exception
of the authorization statutes, none deal specially with the unique prob-
lems which quiet title actions present. Questions of notice, hearing pro-
cedure, legal disability and direct attack can be answered only by culling
the general civil code. The substantive deficiencies in the Indiana stat-
utes are numerous, and these deficiencies have never been remedied by
case law. For example, the authorization statutes permit the status of
most interests in realty to be adjudicated, but a judgment is effective only
as to adverse claimants known to the plaintiff since there are no compre-
hensive notice provisions. If an adverse claimant is under legal disability,
the adjudication is not effective as to him. Moreover, after adjudication
a judgment is subject to direct attack for the lengthy period of seventy-
five years or more. Nor are good faith purchasers protected in many in-
stances if a judgment on which their title is based comes under attack. A
comparison of the Indiana quiet title action with the ideal statutory
scheme presents a framework for further analysis of its defects, empha-
sizes the need for reform, and suggests how the action can be modernized.
Indiana has two quiet title authorization statutes.24 The general
22. See notes 80-83 and accompanying text infra.
23. See American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U.S. 47 (1910); Jones v. York County,
26 F.2d 623 (8th Cir. 1928).
24. The general statute is IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1401 (Burns 1946) and the record
defect statute is IND. AN. STAT. § 3-1405 (Burns 1946). IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 3-1411 to
-1415 (Burns 1946) authorize a procedure for settling possible claims of the state
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statute is broad, presumably authorizing an action by the holder of any
interest in land, provided he is the "real party in interest."25  The plain-
tiff must show title2 to and the nature2' of the interest he seeks to quiet,
and recovery can be had only upon such interest." The plaintiff must
when title to the property has once been held by the state. This procedure is not a true
quiet title action since it is not a judicial proceeding.
IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 3-1402 to -1403 (Burns 1946) provide for quieting title against
an absent nonresident heir. The counterpart of this statute, as to residents, is IND. ANN.
STAT. § 7-2301 (Burns 1933). Both statutes provide that absence for a certain period
of time gives rise to a presumption that the person is dead. Because they are so
specific and cover such a narrow class of adverse claimants, these statutes are relatively
insignificant in the general area of quiet title actions, and are not treated in this note.
25. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-201 (Burns 1946). Chapman v. Jones, 149 Ind. 434, 49
N.E. 347 (1897) ; Simms v. Gilmore, 78 Ind. App. 244, 135 N.E. 183 (1921).
The words of the statute are: "An action may be brought by any person, either in
or out of possession, or by one having an interest in remainder or reversion, against
another who claims title to or an interest in real property adverse to him, although the
defendant may not be in possession thereof, for the purpose of determining and quieting
the question of title." The phrase "may be brought by any person" is ambiguous. The
courts have liberally construed it, however, and have permitted actions to quiet title
to a number of less than fee interests. See, e.g., Chicago & Southeastern Ry. v.
Grantham, 165 Ind. 279, 75 N.E. 265 (1905) (easement) ; Rinkenberger v. Meyer, 155
Ind. 152, 56 N.E. 913 (1900) (remainder) ; Island Coal Co. v. Combs, 152 Ind. 379, 53
N.E. 452 (1898) (heir); Tewksburg v. Howard, 138 Ind. 103, 37 N.E. 355 (1893)
(adverse possessor) ; City of Indianapolis v. Board of Church Extension, 28 Ind. App.
319, 62 N.E. 715 (1901) (mortgagee).
The language in The Indiana Marketable Title Act, IND. ANN. STAT. § 56-1101
(Burns 1963 Supp.), is much more explicit: "Any person who has . . . any interest
in land."
26. Chapman v. Jones, 149 Ind. 434, 47 N.E. 1065 (1897); Baxter v. Baxter,
46 Ind. App. 514, 92 N.E. 881 (1910); Corbin Oil Co. v. Searles, 36 Ind. App. 215,
75 N.E. 293 (1905). The Chapn, case established for Indiana the policy of denying
the right of a quiet title action to one who has no property interest in the title. In that
case Jones and Todd brought an action to quiet title in land owned by Swoveland and
Kinney. Jones once had held title and had conveyed it by warranty deed to Todd who
in turn conveyed one-half to Swoveland and one-half to Kinney by warranty deeds.
In discussing the policy behind its decision the court stated:
We have no means of knowing that the owners desire to have their title quieted,
even if the plaintiffs could lawfully prosecute the action. It would certainly
be a strange proposition that important rights of theirs could be involved in
litigation without their knowledge or consent, and stranger still that they could
be bound by such a judgment, a judgment to which they are not parties, but
strangers. If such a judgment would be binding on them, then it would have
been equally so if it had adjudged that they had no title. If such a result under
the law is possible, then the old legal maxim that every person must have his
day in court before he can be bound by the judgment, is overturned and done
away with. And, if the judgment is not binding on them, then it is not binding
on anybody, because the title to the real estate is the thing that constituted the
subject of the litigation, the thing sought to be affected. If the judgment cannot
be binding on them, then the title to the real estate is not affected by the judg-
ment. Clearly, the complaint, to be good to quiet title, must show title in the
plaintiffs.
149 Ind. at 438, 47 N.E. at 1066 (1897).
27. Stanley v. Holliday, 130 Ind. 464, 30 N.E. 634 (1891) ; Johnson v. Pontious,
118 Ind. 270, 20 N.E. 792 (1888) ; Grisson v. Moore, 106 Ind. 296, 6 N.E. 629 (1885) ;
Sawyer v. Kline, 118 Ind. App. 616, 82 N.E.2d 533 (1948) ; Coppock v. Austin, 34 Ind.
App. 319, 72 N.E. 657 (1904).
28. Ault v. Miller, 203 Ind. 487, 181 N.E. 35 (1931).
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prevail on the strength of his own title, rather than on the weakness of
the defendant's title.2"
The record defect statute authorizes a quiet title action against pos-
sible interests created by certain record defects in title."0 Although in
rem language is used in the provision, it does not in fact authorize an
action that will bind all adverse claimants."' Its verbose, ambiguous and
internally conflicting language32 was interpreted in Bastin v. Meyers"3 to
29. Graham v. Lunsford, 149 Ind. 83, 48 N.E. 627 (1897) ; State v. Tuesburg Land
Co., 161 Ind. App. 555, 109 N.E. 530 (1915); Krotz v. A. R. Beck Lumber Co., 34 Ind.
App. 577, 73 N.E. 273 (1905) ; Dodds v. Winslow, 26 Ind. App. 652, 60 N.E. 548 (1901).
30. IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1405 (Burns 1946).
31. At one point the statute says that "all decrees, orders, judgments and pro-
ceedings had with respect to the title of such lands shall be binding and conclusive upon
all persons whomsoever, and such proceedings shall be taken as a proceeding in rem
against said lands. . . ." IND. ANN STAT. § 3-1405 (Bums 1946).
32. While some portions of the statute are reasonably understandable, the statute
as a whole is nearly incomprehensible. Its 509 word first sentence is illustrative of its
verbosity and ambiguity:
In all proceedings, suits or actions brought in any of the courts of this state to
quiet or determine the title to real estate situated within this state, or any
specific interest therein, or to obtain the title or possession thereof, or to make
partition thereof, or by any executor or administrator to sell the same to make
assets to pay the debts of any decedent, or to enforce or foreclose any mortgage
or other lien thereon, and where there is any break or hiatus in the record title
thereof, or where there exists a defect, or an apparent defect, in or cloud upon the
title to such real estate, on account of defective or inaccurate descriptions thereof
appearing in any matter of record affecting the title to said real estate, or where
it does not appear of record that a grantor or mortgagor was unmarried at the
time of executing any deed or mortgage pertaining to said real estate, or where
it appears from the records that any deed, will, mortgage or other instrument
affecting said real estate was not properly executed, or that a mortgage, vendor's
lien or other lien or encumbrance affecting said real estate has not been properly
or duly released, as disclosed by the public records of the county wherein said
lands are situated, by reason whereof some doubt may be alleged or arise as to
the complete validity of the title claimed or asserted, the party instituting
and prosecuting such proceedings, when he does not have knowledge as to
whether the person or persons who, by any possibility, might claim some right,
title or interest in the lands mentioned and described in such proceedings are
living or dead, and when he does not have knowledge as to the full names of
persons who, by [any] possibility, might claim some right, title or interest in the
lands mentioned and described in such proceedings, whether as husband or wife,
widower or widow, heir or devisee, by reason of their relations to some former
owner, mortgagee or encumbrancer thereof, as disclosed by the public records of
said county or elsewhere, or as to whether such parties are living or dead, may
make defendants to such proceedings any and all persons who might have some
possible interest in such lands, and whose name or names appear of record in
any records affecting said real estate, and may also make defendants to such
proceedings the husband or wife, widower or widow, heirs or devisees, of any
and all such persons appearing of record as a former owner or encumbrancer,
under the designation and description of the unknown husband or wife, widower
or widow, or the unknown heirs or devisees of any such person shown by the
public records of the county in which such lands are situated at any time in the
past to have had any interest in said lands by reason whereof doubt as to the
validity of the title to said lands may arise.
IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1405 (Burns 1946).
33. 82 Ind. App. 325, 144 N.E. 425 (1924).
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be applicable only where (1) there is a break or hiatus in the record title,
(2) a defect or apparent defect upon the title due to a defective or in-
accurate description is found in some matter of record, (3) it does not
appear in the record that a grantor or encumbrancer was unmarried at the
time of executing some deed or encumbrance, or (4) it appears of record
that an instrument affecting the title was not properly executed or re-
leased, thereby causing doubt as to the validity of a plaintiff's title."s The
court in Bastin further limited the statute by declaring that its "purpose"
is to provide a method for the unknown husband, wife, widower, widow,
heir or devisee of persons appearing of record as a former owner or en-
cumbrancer to be made a party defendant and be bound by a quiet title
action, and that only such persons could be bound by the action.3"
Subsequently, the Indiana Supreme Court in Grantham Realty Corp.
v. Bowers" said in dictum that the Appellate Court's declaration of the
statute's "purpose" in Bastin was incorrect, 7 a statement which would
seem to indicate that in the Supreme Court's opinion the statute was too
narrowly construed in the earlier decision. An analysis of the Grantham
decision discloses, however, that this is not the case. The appellant in
Grantham contended that there were no means prior to the enactment of
the record defect statute by which the unkown heirs of a defendant could
be bound by a quiet title decree. In support of this contention he argued
that the statement in Bastin regarding the "purpose" of the statute im-
plied that it was enacted to provide such a means. The court rejected the
appellant's argument and concluded that, because of another provision
of the act,38 the record defect statute was supplemental and additional to
existing laws, and that the unknown heirs of a defendant could have been
bound under a conjunction of the general quiet title and notice by publica-
tion statutes." The only plausible meaning that can be attributed Gran-
tham's reference to the Bastin statement of "purpose" is that in the Su-
preme Court's opinion the record defect statute was not enacted to pro-
vide a previously nonexistent method of binding unknown heirs, as im-
plied by Bastin, but rather it was enacted to provide a supplementary
method of binding such persons. Thus, the substance of the Bastin dec-
34. Id. at 338, 144 N.E. at 429, 430.
35. Id. at 337, 144 N.E. at 429. The court's interpretation was clearly justified
in view of the statute's language. See quoted language at note 32 supra.
36. 215 Ind. 672, 22 N.E.2d 832 (1939).
37. Id. at 683, 22 N.E.2d at 837.
38. IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1406 (Bums 1946) provides that "nothing in this act
[§§ 3-1405, 3-1406] shall be taken to contravene or repeal any other law in this state
concerning the titles to real estate or suits or actions affecting the same, but this act
shall be supplemental and additional to existing laws."
39. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-807 (Burns 1946).
laration of "purpose" was regarded as correct; only its implication was
thought to be in error.
The limitations imposed by such a strict interpretation of the record
defect statute deprive it of any independent significance. An action
under it may be brought only to quiet title to interests originating in the
public records of a county, and title may be quieted only against adverse
interests originating in county records which are held by certain desig-
nated persons. Thus, the statute does not expand at all the scope of
coverage of the general statute. In spite of the confusion engendered by
the existence of two separate authorization statutes, however, their com-
bined scope corresponds generally with the requirements of an ideal stat-
ute. Any weakness in the present authorization scheme could thus be
cured by a single, comprehensive provision.40
Neither of the quiet title authorization statutes contain notice provi-
sions, so notice must be given in the manner prescribed by the notice
statutes found in the general civil code. These statutes provide that known
residents must be personally served,4" known nonresidents may be served
personally or by publication,42 known persons of unknown residence may
be served by publication,43 and unknown persons believed to be non-
40. The South Dakota statute serves as an example of a well drafted, comprehensive
authorization statute:
An action may be maintained by any person or persons having or claiming to
have an estate or interest in or lien or incumbrance upon any real property,
whether in or out of possession thereof and whether such property is vacant or
occupied, against any person or persons claiming an estate or interest in or lien
or incumbrance upon the same or any part thereof for the purpose of determining
such adverse interest, estate, lien, or incumbrance, and against all persons who
appear from the records in the office of the register of deeds, the county
treasurer, clerk of courts, or other public records in the county where such
land lies to have or ever to have had any estate or interest in or lien or
incumbrance upon such real property or any part thereof and against executors,
administrators, heirs at law, devisees, legatees, and creditors of any such person
or persons who may be deceased, whether such executors, administrators,
heirs at law, devisees, legatees, and creditors be known or unknown, and gen-
erally against all persons unknown who may have or claim to have any estate or
interest in or lien or incumbrance upon such real property or any part thereof
for the purpose of quieting the title to such real property and of determining
such estate, interest, lien, or incumbrance, and in such action any number of
persons may be joined as plaintiffs, whether holding as tenants in common, joint
tenants, partners, or in severalty, where the relief demanded in the complaint
is common to all of such plaintiffs.
S.D. CODE § 37.1501 (Supp. 1960).
41. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-803 (Burns 1946).
42. This class of persons may be given notice by personal service outside the
state under IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-808 (Burns 1946), or by publication under IND. ANN.
STAT. § 2-807 (Burns 1946), which in part authorizes notice by publication, "Third.
Where the defendant is not a resident of the state, and the cause of action is . . . to
try and determine, or quiet the title to . . . real estate or any interest therein. .. "
43. Under IND. ANN STAT. § 2-807 (Burns 1946) notice by publication is authorized,
"Fourth. Where the residence of any defendant, upon diligent inquiry is unknown."
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residents may be served by publication.44 Another statute provides that
in quiet title actions service upon known defendants whose names are
known shall also be "legal and binding service upon the heirs, representa-
tives, devisees, legatees, executors, administrators, husbands, wives, re-
ceivers, lessees, successors and assigns, and upon and against all persons
claiming from, through or under them, or either of them. . . .114 Thus,
under present Indiana statutes, either actual or constructive notice may be
given to all adverse claimants except those whose name and residence are
unknown and who are not in privity with a known defendant,46 and this
exception is extremely unwise. A quiet title statute should permit the
plaintiff to give notice to all potential adverse claimants.
It is questionable whether the Indiana notice statutes satisfy the
Mullane standard in all respects. Under these statutes a plaintiff nay
give known nonresidents notice by personal service or by publication.4 7
To comply with the Mullane standard, which demands the best notice pos-
sible under the circumstances, personal service to known nonresidents
whose address can be ascertained with due diligence should be required.4 8
The "best" means of personally serving such persons would probably be
notice by registered or certified mail. 9 Additionally, under the Indiana
44. Under IND. ANN STAT. § 2-807 (Burns 1946) notice by publication is authorized,
"Fifth. Where the name of any defendant is unknown, and he is believed to be a
nonresident."
45. IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1404 (Burns 1946).
46. It could be argued that notice to such persons could be given by using both
the fourth and fifth clauses of the notice by publication statute. However, it would be
impossible to do so consistently, for the fourth clause requires an affidavit that the
residence of the defendant is unknown while the fifth clause requires an affidavit that the
defendant is believed to be a nonresident. A similar inconsistency is found in the
affidavits required when an action is brought under the record defect statute in con-
junction with the notice by publication statute. There are no reported cases on this point.
Another possibility is IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1070 (Burns 1946), which provides that
"when the plaintiff is ignorant of the name of the defendant, such defendant may be
designated in any pleading or proceeding by any name; and when his true name is
discovered, the pleading or proceeding may be amended accordingly, either before or
after service of the summons." Under a liberal interpretation of this statute, it could
be argued that an unknown quiet title defendant could be sued under the name "John
Doe"; and, if the defendant ever appeared, the ficticious name could be changed to
the defendant's true name. In such a case, each unknown defendant would have to be
designated by a different ficticious name, and a few extra names could be added for
possible unknown defendants. This would be a tenuous argument on which to base a
quiet title action against unknown defendants. Although this statute was enacted in 1881,
there have been no reported cases under it involving this point.
47. See note 42 supra.
48. See Note, Due Process of Law and Notice by Publication, 32 INn. L. J. 469
(1957).
49. "However it may have been in former times, the mails today are recognized as
an efficient and inexpensive means of communication." Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 319 (1950). A statute embodying a notice by mail
requirement is found at ALA. CODE tit 7, § 1118 (1960). This statute provides that notice
to known nonresident defendants "shall be sent by the register of the court in which
statutes publication is the only means prescribed for notice to persons who
are unknown or cannot be located. Any attempt to notify such persons
would probably be a meaningless gesture, but the Mullane standard re-
quires notice by the practicable means most likely to inform interested
parties of the action. Therefore, publication should be retained as a
requirement for notifying claimants who are unknown, or cannot be lo-
cated,"0 and the statute in addition should require the plaintiff to post
notice of his action on the land."' Of course increasing a plaintiff's
burden of notice to adverse claimants correspondingly increases the vul-
nerability of the action to subsequent collateral attack for failure to
strictly follow the detail of requirements. Indiana case law, which
recognizes the conclusiveness of a court's judgment that the facts stated
in the plaintiff's affidavit are sufficient to authorize constructive service,
therefore should be retained and explicitly spelled out in an improved
statute.
52
In practice, most quiet title actions probably result in a default judg-
ment for the plaintiff."3 If an adverse claimant defends the action and
establishes a valid interest in the subject property, however, the plain-
tiff's title of course will not be quieted as to that interest." When a
the proceeding is pending to such parties by registered mail, postage prepaid, marked
'For Delivery to Addressee Only', and return receipt demanded, addressed to the
register of the court in which the proceeding is pending."
50. This section should authorize notice by publication to unknown defendants
or defendants who cannot be located, regardless of whether or not they are resident or
nonresident.
51. For an example of a statute containing this requirement see, Nzv. REv. STAT.
§ 40.100(2) (1961) which provides that "within 30 days after the issuance of the
summons, the plaintiff shall post or cause to be posted a copy thereof in a conspicuous
place on each separate parcel of the property described in the complaint. .. ."
52. See note 83 and accompanying text infra. The utility of such a provision
would be lessened, however, in that it probably would not preclude a Mullane inquiry
into the propriety of the court's jurisdiction. See Note, supra note 48, at 480.
53. A defendant may be declared to be in default under IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1905
(Burns 1963 Supp.) for failure to appear, or under IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1102 (Burns
1946) for failure to plead within the prescribed time.
54. See Ault v. Miller, 203 Ind. 487, 181 N.E. 35 (1931).
The defendant may also offer other defenses. The "catch-all" statute of limitation,
IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-603 (Burns 1946), provides that all actions not limited by another
statute of limitation must be brought within fifteen years. This statute applies to quiet
title actions. Sinclair v. Gunzenhauser, 179 Ind. 78, 98 N.E. 37, 100 N.E. 376 (1912).
It begins to run when some assertion of the defendant's interest in the property has
been brought to the plaintiff's attention. Hegarty v. Curtis, 121 Ind. App. 74, 95 N.E.2d
706 (1950). There appears to be no reason for applying a statute of limitation to a
quiet title action. A plaintiff should be able to have the status of his title adjudicated
irrespective of the age of the adverse claim, or when he became aware of it.
Since the action is equitable in nature, the plaintiff may be required to "do equity"
before the court will quiet his title. Cassel v. Lawry, 164 Ind. 1, 72 N.E. 640 (1904).
In the cited case the plaintiff was required to pay a debt under a vendor's lien before
title could be quieted against the lien. Laches may also preclude the plaintiff's quiet
title action. Grantham Realty Corp. v. Bowers, 215 Ind. 672, 22 N.E.2d 832 (1939).
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constructively summoned defendant fails to appear, the plaintiff is re-
quired to prove the allegations of his complaint." The court in its dis-
cretion, also, may order the plaintiff in such cases to appear personally
before the court or a commissioner and answer questions in regard to
the complaint or matters which might constitute a defense to the com-
plaint."6 To protect the interests of such defendants, these requirements
should be retained and specifically applied to a quiet title action in an
improved statute.5"
While the Indiana statutes affecting quiet title actions do afford
some special consideration to persons under legal disability, it is doubtful
that they satisfy the Covey standard of due process." Covey requires that
an adverse claimant known to be under legal disability be protected by a
guardian both at the time notice is given and at all times during the pro-
ceedings."5 In Indiana, if a legally disabled adverse claimant is under
guardianship at the time the action is brought, notice must be served up-
on the guardian.65 However, there is no Indiana statute which authorizes
the appointment of a guardian ad litem for the purpose of receiving
process.6 ' This appears to be an obvious violation of Covey's prescrip-
It is not clear in Indiana whether the existence of an "adequate remedy at law" will
prevent the plaintiff from maintaining a successful quiet title action. See Hollars v.
Stephenson, 121 Ind. App. 410, 418, 99 N.E.2d 258, 262 (1951), where the court stated
that it seemed clear that plaintiff did not have an adequate remedy at law. By negative
implication it could be concluded that if he had an adequate remedy at law the action
could not be maintained. It is not clear, however, whether the quoted statement refers
to the quiet title action, or to an injunction which was also sought by the plaintiff.
See also, 74 CJ.S. Quieting Title § 10a (1951) stating generally that a quiet title action
will not be entertained where an adequate remedy at law is available.
55. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1059 (Burns 1946).
56. INn. ANN. STAT. § 2-1060 (Burns 1946).
57. The language of the present Indiana statutes would probably be adequate if it
were made mandatory. The Utah statute specifically applies this policy to a quiet title
action:
When the summons has been served and the time for answering has expired,
the court shall proceed to hear the cause as in other cases, and shall have juris-
diction to examine into and determine the legality of the plaintiff's title and
of the title and claims of all the defendants and of all unknown persorqs, and to
that end must not enter any judgment by default against unknown defendants,
but must in all cases require evidence of plaintiff's title and possession and
hear such evidence as may be offered respecting the claims and title of any
of the defendants, and must thereafter enter judgment in accordance with the
evidence and the law. The judgment shall be conclusive against all the persons
named in the summons and complaint who have been served and against all such
unknown persons as stated in the complaint and summons who have been served
by publication.
UTAH CODE ANN. 78-40-13 (1953).
58. See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
59. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
60. INn. ANN. STAT. § 2-803 (Bums 1946).
61. Two Indiana statutes provide for the appointment of a guardian ad litem. INn.
ANN. STAT. § 2-209 (Burns 1946) requires that "an infant-defendant shall appear and
defend by guardian appointed by the court or chosen by such infant with the consent
NOTES
tions, and is thus a defect in the statutory quiet title scheme that should
be corrected.
The term "legal disability" is defined by statute in Indiana to include
"persons within the age of twenty-one years, or of unsound mind, or
imprisoned in the state prison, or out of the United States.""2  While
there are statutes that require the appointment of a guardian ad litem for
infants and persons of unsound mind," none authorizes such an appoint-
ment for persons imprisoned in the state prison or out of the United
States. Since a characteristic common to all the legally disabled is their
inability or inopportunity to protect themselves 4 it is anomalous to re-
quire a guardian ad litem for some members of this class and not for
others. However, the required appointment should be limited to persons
known to be, or who with due diligence could be known to be, under legal
disability; and it should be clear that a judgment against an unknown
person, or against a person who with due diligence could not be known
to be under legal disability but who is in fact so disabled, is conclusive
even though such person was not represented by a guardian ad litem.65
of the court." IND. ANN STAT. § 2-803 (Burns 1946) provides that, if no guardian has
been appointed for a person of unsound mind, service shall be had upon the person in
"custody of such person; in which case, upon proof of the insanity of the defendant,
the court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for such defendant, whose duty it shall be
to make proper defense to such action." Both of these statutes apply only to the defense
of the action. Thus, the appointment of a guardian ad litem is authorized only after
notice is given. Also, it would appear that these statutes are applicable regardless
of whether or not it is known that the defendant is legally disabled. See note 65 and
accompanying text infra.
62. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-4701 (Burns 1946). This statute in turn defines the
phrase "of unsound mind" to include "idiots, noncompotes, lunatics and distracted
persons." Because it is only descriptive, this definition is of little help in determining
whether a person is "of unsound mind." For an exhaustive discussion of the Indiana
courts' struggle to formulate useful standards in ascertaining whether a person is "of
unsound mind," see Note, Mental Incompetence in Indiana: Standards and Types of
Evidence, 34 IND. L.J. 492 (1959).
63. See note 61 supra.
64. This class presently includes persons who are in the "state prison." This should
be expanded to include all persons detained by executive authority at the time of the
action for a stipulated minimum term. This term could be determined in relation
to the direct attack time period.
The appointment of a guardian ad litem should not be required for those persons
who have at the time the action is brought, or immediately thereafter themselves procure,
a guardian or an attorney to attend to their affairs.
65. An example of a statute embodying this policy is UTAHi CODE ANN. 78-40-12
(1953) which provides:
Where service of process is made upon unknown defendants by publication, the
action shall proceed against such unknown persons in the same manner as against
the defendants who are named and upon whom service is made by publication, and
any such unknown person who has or claims to have any right, title, estate,
lien or interest in the said property, which is a cloud on the title thereto,
adverse to the plaintiff, at the time of the commencement of the action, who has
been duly served as aforesaid, and anyone claiming under him, shall be concluded
by the judgment in such action as effectually as if the action were brought
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Apparently, in Indiana, a defendant under legal disability is not bound
by a quiet title judgment even though he was represented in the action by
a guardian ad litem.6" Such treatment is incompatible with the objective
of a quiet title action, and is a serious impediment to the effectiveness of
the Indiana quiet title acts.67 The law in this regard should be changed by
statute so that a judgment against a person under legal disability who was
represented by a guardian ad litem would be conclusive in the same man-
ner as a judgment is conclusive against any other defendant."8
The Indiana Civil Code contains several direct attack provisions ap-
plying to judgments generally, which allow a quiet title judgment to be
reopened, reviewed, negated or appealed within varying periods of time
after adjudication.69 When notice has been given by publication, and the
defendant has received no actual notice of the pendency of the action, he
against such person by his or her name, notwithstanding such unknown person
may be under legal disability.
66. Attica Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Colvert, 216 Ind. 192, 23 N.E.2d 483 (1939).
In this case the plaintiff had been made a defendant in a quiet title action in 1916.
She was served process; and, since she was at that time an infant, a guardian ad litem
was appointed to represent her interests. The guardian ad litem filed a demurrer,
which was overruled, and then a general denial. After considering the merits of the
case, the court found against the infant. When she reached her majority in 1928, the
plaintiff filed an original complaint under IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-2604 (Burns 1946) to
review the 1916 judgment for error of law appearing in the proceedings and judgment.
The overruling of the demurrer to the complaint in the original judgment was found to
be clearly erroneous. The original judgment was vacated and another trial was had upon
the same issues. The court held that, even though the plaintiff had been represented
by a guardian ad litem, she was not bound by the judgment. It further held that an
innocent purchaser of real estate who takes title founded upon a judgment takes it
subject to an unsuccessful infant defendant, should the judgment be set aside in an
action to review brought by the defendant after she has reached her majority.
Although the result of the case is probably correct since the plaintiff had been
deprived of her property in the original action by an error of law, its precedent is
certainly a threat to the security of land titles. There has been no case involving the
legal disability question since Attica.
67. See Note, Review by Infant Notwithstanding Representation in Prior Suit,
15 IND. L.J. 437 (1940).
68. This is the general case law and statutory rule. 43 C.J.S. Infants § 122a (1945).
The Indiana Marketable Title Act does not give persons under legal disability
special rights. It provides:
Any person claiming an interest in land may preserve and keep effective such
interest by filing for record during the fifty-year period immediately following
the effective date of the root of the title of the person whose record title
would otherwise be marketable, a notice in writing, duly verified by oath,
setting forth the nature of the claim. No disability or lack of knowledge of
any kind on the part of anyone shall suspend the running of said fifty-year
period. Such notice may be filed for record by the claimant or by any other
person acting on behalf of any claimant who is: (1) under a disability; (2)
unable to assert a claim on his own behalf; or (3) one of a class, but whose
identity cannot be established or is uncertain at the time of filing such notice
of claim for record.
IND. ANN. STAT. § 56-1104 (Burns 1963 Supp.).
69. For a general discussion of these various methods, see Note, Procedural
Techniques for Belated Attacks on Judgments in Indiana, 32 IND. L.J. 205 (1956).
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may have the judgment reopened at any time within one year after it was
rendered."0 A judgment may be reviewed for an error of law any time
within one year after rendition, and it can be examined for a material new
matter within three years thereafter.71 Moreover, relief must be granted
from a quiet title judgment when mistake, inadvertance, surprise or ex-
cusable neglect is shown within one year from the date of judgment.2
And finally, a judgment may be appealed or reviewed within ninety days
after it or the ruling on the motion for a new trial was renderedY.7  Thus,
a quiet title judgment may be directly attacked within a period of time
ranging from ninety days to three years after rendition, depending upon
the nature of the judgment and the basis of the attack.
In cases where a defendant is under legal disability, the period dur-
ing which a judgment may be directly attacked is extended. If the de-
fendant was under disability at the time the judgment was handed down,
he has one year after the disability is removed to have the judgment re-
viewed,74 and ninety days after it is removed to perfect an appeal."
Neither the reopening nor relief statute contains provisions which extend
the period during which persons under legal disability may reopen or be
relieved from a judgment, but case law indicates that a two year period
is applicableY.7  Thus, a person under legal disability may directly attack
a judgment within a period of time ranging from ninety days to two
years after the disability is removed-a period which conceivably extends
from two to seventy-five years or more.
Since most quiet title actions are instituted immediately before the
sale of realty to assure marketability,77 the purchaser is usually a party
defendant if a judgment is subsequently attacked. It has been held in
Indiana that when a purchaser's title rests upon the judgment of a court of
record he is charged with notice of the incidents to which the judgment is
70. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 2-2601-02 (Burns 1963 Supp.).
71. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 2-2604-05 (Bums 1946).
72. IND. ANN. STAT.§ 2-1068 (Burns 1946).
73. IND. Sup. CT. R. 2-2.
74. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-2604 (Burns 1946).
75. IND. Sup. CT. R. 2-2.
76. See Macy v. Lindley, 54 Ind. App. 157, 99 N.E. 790 (1913), which held that
the statute of limitation, which provides that persons under legal disability when a cause
of action accrues may bring their actions within two years after the disability is removed,
IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-605 (Burns 1946), applies to the reopening statute. The court's
reasoning was that since both statutes dealt with the same general subject, viz., the
limitation of actions, they must be construed in pari inateria. Because the relief
statute is a statute of limitation in the same sense as is a reopening statute, it seems that
the court's reasoning supports the conclusion that the legal disability statute of limitation
would apply to it also.
77. See Note, Enhancing the Marketability of Land: The Suit to Quiet Title, 68
YALE L.J. 1245, 1314 (1959).
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subjected, he is conclusively presumed to know that the judgment may be
appealed within a stipulated time, and therefore he cannot be considered a
good faith purchaser." Hence, when land which has been the subject of
a quiet title action is sold, the purchaser and subsequent purchasers in
many instances take it subject to the risk of attack during an indefinite
period of time."
In order to achieve reasonable security of title by quiet title actions,
the risk of direct attack should be minimized for both the plaintiff who
brings the action and subsequent good faith purchasers. Selecting a time
period for direct attack which would be fair to all the parties that may be
involved requires the interests of the adverse parties to be balanced. The
interests of adverse claimants who have been, or possibly have been,
wrongfully deprived of their property militate for a long direct attack
period. On the other hand, the interests of the plaintiff and subsequent
purchasers in the security of their title call for the shortest possible period.
The opposing considerations necessitate a compromise and any resolution
must best effectuate the rationale of quiet title procedures in a manner
which is consistent with due process of law.
A compromise might be accomplished by permitting the original de-
fendant, during a ninety day period,8" to directly attack the judgment and
seek to have it set aside against either the original plaintiff or a good
faith purchaser.8 During the remainder of a two year period the original
defendant's remedy could be limited to an action against the original
plaintiff to recover the monetary value of his asserted interest.12  Such
a provision would equitably protect the interests of successful, original
78. Attica Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Colvert, 216 Ind. 192, 23 N.E.2d 483 (1939);
Dunnington v. Elston, 101 Ind. 373 (1884); Schrenker v. Hayden, 129 Ind. App. 529,
157 N.E.2d 200 (1959).
79. Under the reopening statute a "purchaser in good faith" is not affected when
a judgment is reopened. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-2603 (Burns 1946). However, Dunnington
v. Elston, supra note 78, at 375, holds that a purchaser is conslusively presumed to
know the incidents of his title, and, if it rests on a judicial proceeding, he is not a
"purchaser in good faith." This portion of the reopening statute is a nullity, for a
purchaser in such a situation could never be a "purchaser in good faith."
It is not clear how a "purchaser in good faith" would fare in an action under the
relief statute. Note, Protection Accorded a Purchaser of Liand From a Default
tected in an action under the review statute, would be applicable to an action under the
relief statute. Note, Protection Accorded a Purchaser of Land From a Default
Judgment Plaintiff, 28 IND. L.J. 230, 234 (1952).
80. A ninety day period is suggested because it is short enough to preclude sub-
stantial inconvenience, even in a land-sale context where the passing of title could
be delayed for that period. If it were necessary to complete a sale immediately, the
possibility of the purchaser being divested of his title would be kept at a minimum.
See Note, supra note 77, at n.219.
81. See Note, supra note 79, at 236, 237.
82. The grounds for direct attack would remain the same as they are under existing
legislation. See notes 69-73 and accompanying text supra.
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plaintiffs, subsequent good faith purchasers, and original plaintiffs with
a divested interest. An original plaintiff or a subsequent good faith
purchaser, after a ninety day period, would have a conclusively secure
title to land which he could hold, sell or improve without fear of adverse
claims against the property. At the same time, an original defendant
would be protected. During the ninety day period he would be able to
have the judgment set aside, recover his interest, and thereafter recover
the monetary value of the interest within a two year period. The provi-
sion would make a quiet title action of more immediate value to a plain-
tiff, and at the same time it effectively would protect the countervailing
interests of a defendant.8 3  The suggested methods of initially protecting
the interest of adverse claimants under legal disability should preclude
any necessity for giving such persons special consideration in the direct
attack provisions.8 4 These provisions should specify that they are ap-
plicable whether or not a defendant is under legal disability. 5
A judgment, in addition to the possibility of direct attack, is also
subject to collateral attack. In most cases a collateral attack probably
will not be available, and its chances of success are less than those of a
direct attack. A judgment generally will not be set aside on collateral
attack unless it is void because the court was without jurisdiction over
the subject matter or the parties.8" The possibility of successfully attack-
ing the subject matter jurisdiction of a court is remote because the proper
83. South Dakota has a provision similar to the provision suggested in the text:
The Court may, in its discretion and upon such terms as may be just, at any time
within two years after the entry of judgment, relieve a defendant in such action
from the judgment, if taken against him through his mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect, and allow such party to defend the action, but the
defense, if successful, shall be without prejudice to the rights of a purchaser or
incumbrancer in good faith of the premises from the plaintiff after the entry of
such judgment, and before the making of the order permitting such defendant to
defend. Before the entry of judgment in such action, the plaintiff must execute
a bond of indemnity to the defendants in the action who shall be served by
publication, with sufficient surety to be approved by the Court, in such sum as
the Court shall direct, conditioned that if any defendant shall be permitted
to defend after judgment, as herein provided, and such defense shall be suc-
cessful, that the plaintiff will pay to such defendant the value of his interest in
said premises, and his costs of defending the action. Provided, however, that
personal service of the summons and complaint outside of this state, in the
manner provided by the laws of this state, shall, for the purposes of this section,
be deemed personal service and not service by publication.
S.D. CODE § 37.1514 (Supp. 1960). Under such a provision, the requirement of an
indemnity bond appears to be desirable in order to assure the original defendant that he
will be able to collect his judgment for the monetary value of his interest. Such a
requirement would be similar to, but less cumbersome than, the state administered indem-
nification funds of Torrens legislation. See COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 118-10-86 to
-91 (1953).
84. See notes 62-65 and accompanying text supra.
85. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 66.22 (1943).
86. Spencer v. Spencer, 31 Ind. App. 321, 67 N.E. 1018 (1903).
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venue of a quiet title action is easily determined.87 Acquisition of juris-
diction over the parties is, of course, somewhat more complex. If a
necessary person is not made a party to an action, or is not given legally
sufficient notice, 8 the court hearing the action is without jurisdiction
over him, and any judgment against him is void.89
It is virtually impossible to directly protect a judgment from col-
lateral attack. A quiet title statute can do no more than provide a means
of acquiring valid jurisdiction over all adverse claimants by affording
them procedural due process via legally sufficient procedures for notice,
and protect persons under legal disability.9" Then, only diligent adher-
ence to the statutory procedures by the plaintiff's lawyer and the trial
court can eliminate the possibility of collateral attack.
III. CONCLUSION
Indiana's law affecting quiet litle actions has been long neglected by
the legislature. The existing piecemeal legislation is wholly inadequate
to provide a landowner with a means of easily and conclusively quieting
his title, and it does not measure up to the recognized standards of pro-
cedural due process. A reform in the law, commensurate with an ideal
quiet title statute, is long overdue.
An improvement of the Indiana law affecting quiet title actions
would benefit many persons. A lawsuit which would virtually guarantee
a landowner that his property is free from all title defects would be of
obvious general social value for it could increase the alienability of land,
and it would be of particular value to a homeowner or farmer interested
in safeguarding his primary asset, a businessman interested in safeguard-
87. Since land is the subject matter in a quiet title action, the circuit court of the
county in which the land is located has original exclusive jurisdiction. IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 4-303 (Burns 1946). In cases where the land is located in two or more counties,
the first court that takes jurisdiction retains it. IND. ANN. STAT. § 4-308 (Burns 1946).
The record defect authorization statute has special provisions which are applicable when
the land is situated in two or more counties. In such a case, notice must be published
and the decree recorded in each county involved. IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1405 (Burns 1946).
88. In many states it is common to collaterally attack a judgment on the grounds
that statutory requirements in regard to the affidavit for notice by publication have
not been followed, and that consequently the court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the parties. Annot., 21 A.L.R.2d 929 (1952). This has not been the case in Indiana,
however, where it has long been the law that when there has been constructive notice
the determination of the court that the facts stated in the plaintiff's affidavit are
sufficient to authorize constructive service is conclusive as to all parties. Sinclair v.
Gunzenhauser, 179 Ind. 78, 98 N.E. 37 (1912) ; Goodell v. Starr, 127 Ind. 198, 26 N.E.
793 (1890). In such case the judgment is not subject to collateral attack. Stevens v.
Reynolds, 143 Ind. 467, 41 N.E. 931 (1895). The only remedy is review, Pitts v. Jackson,
135 Ind. 211, 35 N.E. 10 (1893), or appeal, Carrico v. Tarwater, 103 Ind. 86, 2 N.E. 227
(1885) ; Dowell v. Lahr, 97 Ind. 146 (1884).
89. Thompson v. McCorkle, 136 Ind. 484, 34 N.E. 813 (1893).
90. See notes 48-65 and accompanying text supra.
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ing a valuable investment, or a commercial enterprise about to make
costly improvements. Lawyers, title insurance companies, and other
groups with commercial interests in land titles should not object to a
modernization that would have no substantial affect on their commercial
interests.
LEGISLATIVE REVISION OF PROPERTY CRIMES IN INDIANA
The Indiana legislature in 1963 enacted a comprehensive statute
entitled "The Offenses Against Property Act" which became effective
January 1, 1964.' The primary purpose of this act is to unify several
traditionally distinct property crimes in order to eliminate the procedural
technicalities which have hindered or precluded the conviction of offend-
ers in the past. Specifically, larceny, embezzlement, obtaining property
by false pretenses, receiving stolen property and blackmail are no longer
separate offenses; they have been consolidated into a single offense, theft,
which can be committed in various ways. In addition to consolidation,
substantive changes have been incorporated. Therefore, the act represents
a revision rather than merely a re-codification of prior Indiana law
relating to property crimes.2
Prior to the effective date of the act, the property crime sections
of the Indiana criminal code were a hodge-podge of multiplicitous pro-
visions and penalties. Seventy separate statutory sections dealing with
property crimes were in force, scattered throughout the criminal code.
Since many of these provisions were enacted years apart and without
reference to other sections, a great deal of duplication as well as much
unnecessary specificity resulted. More serious, however, was the fact that
similar criminal conduct was frequently accorded substantially different
punishment. For example, the criminal code not only contained general
1. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 10-3028 to -3041 (Burns Spec. Supp. 1963). A very similar
statute was approved in Illinois July 1, 1961, which became effective January 1, 1962.
See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §15 (Spec. Pamphlet 1961).
2. The repealing clause of the new act expressly states that the following Indiana
laws relating to property crimes remain in force: IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-4102 (Burns 1956)
(bank robbery) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-4710 (Burns 1956) (automobile banditry) ; IND.
ANN. STAT. § 10-4101 (Burns 1956) (robbery) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-4709 (Burns 1956)
(commission of or attempt to commit a crime while armed with a deadly weapon). Since
provisions of the new act deal with obtaining property by threat, IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-
3030(1) (c) (Burns Spec. Supp. 1963), and attempts to obtain property by threat, IN.
ANN. STAT. § 10-3041 (Burns Spec. Supp. 1963), prosecutors will have the choice of
relying on the new provisions or the unrepealed provisions noted above in cases involving
robbery or attempted robbery.
